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STOCKSTILL v. PETTY RAY (Cont.) 
a notice of appeal from the dismissal of its claim against B&B. 
B&B did not file a notice of appeal from the dimissal of its claim 
against BMF. 
BMF contends that B&B may not appeal this determination 
because it failed to file a notice of appeal and that Geosource has 
no standing to appeal this dismissal because it never filed a claun 
against BMF. 
ISSUES: ( 1J Is B&B liable to Geosource? 
<2J May appellate jurisdiction be exercised over the 
clai lT: against BMF? 
ANALYSIS: The District Court relied upon Lanasse v. Travelers 
Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1971) in dismtssing Geosource's 
claim against B&B. Geosource's claim was based upon the fact 
that it would have been covered, had B&B ir.cluded Geosource 
as an additional insured on B&B's P&I policy, as agreed. The 
Lanasse case stated that a charterer could be covered by an 
owner's P&I policy if ( 1) the accident was caused by a vessel or 
its crew and (2) liability flowed from the insured's status as 
vessel owner. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, found, 
contrary to the district court, that Stockstill and Sandidge were 
crew members of the BB-300. In fact, the parties stipulated that 
Stockstill was a member of the crew of the 11eet of vessels which 
included the barge. Geosource also passes the second requirment 
because, as a demise or bareboat charterer, it may be considered 
a vessel "owner" for the purposes of P&I coverage. 
Since B&B breached its agreement to have its P&I insurance 
endorsed to name Goesource as an additional insured it must 
provide such coverage to Geosource. 
The Court of Appeals rejected B&B's contention, relying on 
Anthony v. Petroleum Helecoptors, Inc., 693 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 
1982) and Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337 \9th 
Cir. 1981), that an initial notice of appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 
\ 4 )(a)( 1 J is mandatory and jurisdictional but a notice of protec­
tive or cross-appeal under Rule \4HaH3J is permissive and 
courts of appeal may retain all parties in order to do justice. 
The Court stated that it is questionable whether Anthony or 
Bryant remains good law in light of Torres v. Oakland Scavenger 
Co., 487 U.S. _, 108 S.Ct. 2405, 101 L.Ed.2d 285 \ 1988J which 
held that the requirments of Rules 3 and 4 are mandatory and 
jurisdictional and that although the courts of appeal may liberally 
construe those rules to determine whether they have been complied 
with, the courts may not waive non-compliance. 
The Court held, that even if Anthony or Bryant is good law, 
the present case does not fall within the exception. The exception 
is only available when the appealed decision could be read as not 
being adverse to the party who failed to file timely notice of 
appeal. B&B may not take advantage of this exception because 
the dismissal of its claim was clearly adverse to it. 
Seh-Yoon Park '91 
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. LAKE SHORE INC. 
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, 20 September 1989 
886F.2d 654 
Where defendant does not have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to justify the exercise of personal. 
jurisdiction, neither a general "stream of commerce" theory nor the unique nature of ocean-going vessels will support the 
exercise of personal jurisditction. 
FACTS: In April of 1985, General Electric Company <GEl 
shipped a turbine accessory base aboard the M/V Paul Bunyon. 
While the base was being loaded aboard the vessel a cargo winch 
allegedly malfunctioned causing the base to fall and become 
damaged. At the time of the accident the vessel was docked in 
Charleston, South Carolina. Under its contract of insurance, 
Federal Insurance Company <Federal) paid GE $322,543.46 fi>r 
the damaged base. Plaintiff-appellant, Federal, a New Jersey 
Corporation, thus became entitled to the subrogated claim of GE. 
The M/V Paul Bunyon was designed and manufactured by 
defendant-appellee Peterson Builders Inc. <Peterson), a 
Wisconsin corporation with its principal place of business in 
Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin, engaged in the design and manufacture 
of ocean-going vessels. Defendant-appellee, Lake Shore Inc. 
<Lake Shore), is a Michigan corporation engaged in the design, 
manufacture, and sale of cargo winches, with its principal place 
of business in Iron Mountain, Michigan. 
The Lake Shore cargo winch installed on the M/V Paul Bun yon 
was manufactured in Michigan and the vessel was designed and 
manufactured in Wisconsin for American Heavy Lift Shipping 
Company <AHL), a Delaware corporation. The contract of sale 
between Peterson and AHL was executed in Wisconsin and 
Pennsylvania. AHL accepted delivery of the vessel in 
Wisconsin. 
In March of 1988, Federal filed suit against Peterson, Lake 
Shore and American Ship Management <American) in the United 
States District Court for the District of South Carolina, involving 
the court's admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. American is a 
Delaware Corporation that hired the vessel's crew and handled 
the vessel's insurance needs. Federal sought to recover the 
$322,543.46 paid to GE plus interest and costs, for causes of action 
including: negligence, strict liability, and breach of express and 
implied warranties. Peterson and Lake Shore entered special 
appearances and moved to dismiss for lack of in personam 
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jurisdiction. American moved for summary judgment. The district 
court held that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the 
Defendants and granted Federal's and Lake Shore's motion to 
dismiss and American's motion for summary judgment. 
Federal appealed the district court's grant of Lake Shore's 
and Peterson's motion to dismiss. 
Lake Shore and Peterson do not maintain offices in South 
Carolina and are not licensed to do business in that state. 
Neither has agents, employees or subsidiaries in South Carolina 
and neither maintains a bank account or owns real or personal 
property in the state. Also, all of Lake Shore's products and 
materials sold to South Carolina residents have been shipped 
F.O.B. Michigan. 
ISSUES: 1J Do defendants have sufficient "minimum con­
tacts" with South Carolina such that the exercise of in personam 
jurisdiction would not offend the "traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice" embodied in the constitutional principles 
of due process? 
2) In the absence of such "minimum contacts" will a 
general stream of commerce theory or the unique nature of ocean­
going vessels support the exercise of personal jurisdiction? 
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals, for the Fourth Circuit, 
affirmed the district court's finding that defendants lacked suf­
ficient "minimum contacts" with South Carolina to be amenable 
to suit there. The court also held that without such contacts 
neither the nature of ocean-going vessels nor a stream of com­
merce theory supported the exercise of in personam jurisdiction 
over defendants. 
The court noted that Congress had not authorized nation­
wide service of process in admiralty cases so that South 
Carolina's long-arm statute (construed to extend jurisdiction "to 
(continues .. .) 
FED. INS. v. LAKE SHORE (Cont.) 
the outer limits" of due process, Triplett v. R.M. Wade& Co., 261 
S.C. 419 (1973)) had to be applied to determine whether the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction met the requirements of due 
process. The Court noted that, "the constitutional touchstone 
remains whether the defendant purposefully established 
'minimum contacts' in the forum," Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 
471 U.S. 467, 474 (1985) "such that the maintenance of the suit 
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.' " International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
316 (1945) quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). 
Under the facts, the Court found that the defendant's contact 
with the forum state did not suggest a purposefulness, and thus 
personal jurisdiction could not be asserted without offending 
notions of due process. 
The court also rejected Federal's argument that defendants 
were subject to South Carolina's personal jurisdiction under a 
stream of commerce theory. Citing Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. 
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 ( 1986), the Court noted that factors 
such as marketing and advertising by defendants in the forum 
state which might make a stream of commerce theory applicable 
were lacking. Moreover, in this case, defendants' products were 
transported into the forum by a consumer. To allow the state to 
use this as a means of exercising personal jurisdiction over 
defendants would effectively mean that, "amenability to suit 
would travel with the chattel." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980). Also, this case did not 
involve multiple deliveries of units into South Carolina over a 
period of years. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 122. Though the court did not 
reject out of hand a stream of commerce theory, such a theory 
clearly did not apply in this case. 
Finally, the court rejected Federal's assertion that the nature 
of an ocean-going vessel (designed and manufactured) to go 
from port to port is such that it sustains the exercise of personal 
juridsiction. Recognizing that the Supreme Court had already 
rejected such an argument in World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 
at 296 n.11, the court added that all products are mobile to some 
extent and a product-by-product approach tb personal jurisdiction 
would succeed only in drawing courts into an arcane and litigi­
ous search for meaningless distinctions. Thus, the question to 
ask in assessing whether personal jurisdiction can properly be 
asserted is not as to the nature of the product, but the nature of 
the defendants' contacts with the forum state. 
Upon these findings, the Court held that it would not be 
reasonable for personal jurisdiction to be asserted over defendants, 
that this was sufficient independent grounds for dismissal. In 
support of this conclusion, the court noted certain factors that 
should be considered in determining whether the assertion of 
personal jurisdiction offends due process requirements. The 
court included among the factors; the defendant's burden in 
litigating in the forum, the forum state's interest, the plaintiffs 
interest in obtaining relief in the forum, the interstate judicial 
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 
controversies and the shared interest of the several states in 
furthering fundamental social policies. In this case, the court 
found that the defendant's contacts with the state of South 
Carolina are insufficient to warrant the proper assertion of 
personal jurisdiction. Based on the foregoing, the court affirmed 
the district court judgment granting defendants' motion to dis­
miss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
Alex Barnett '9 1 
AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO. v. L & L MARINE SERVICE INC. 
United States Court of Appeals, Eight Circuit, 6 July 1989 
87 5 F.2d 1351 
Negligence by the operators of a vessel does not act to supervene the owners absolute duty to provide a seaworthy vessel 
for the voyage intended. All the resulting damages will be allocated by the comparative degree of fault of the parties. The 
work by a tug of pulling the vessel off a shoal is properly classified as towage rather than salvage. 
FACTS: The barge Apex Chicago and the tug Maya went aground 
off the coast of Massachusetts on October 19, 1981, while en­
route from Carteret, New Jersey to Boston, Massachusetts. The 
crew of the tug were employees of L & L Marine Service (L&LJ, 
which operated the barge and tug under an agreement with 
Apex Towing (Apex). The National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) had issued small craft advisories along 
the route and upgraded them to gale warnings by 6:00 PM on 
October 18th. Instead of heeding the warnings, the Maya left 
the protected waters of Long Island Sound and proceeded into 
the open waters of Block Island Sound and Rhode Island Sound. 
While in Rhode Island Sound early on the morning of October 
19th, severe weather was encountered, consisting of winds up to 
35 knots, squalls, zero visibility and ten foot seas. During this 
rough leg of the voyage, the towing cable parted. Due to the 
intensity of the storm, the crew did not realize that the barge 
had come adrift for thirty minutes. Expert testimony showed 
that the breaking strength of the tow cable was significantly 
lower than that required by industry standards. This problem 
was exacerbated by the fact that the crew could not let out more 
cable to reduce the stress. The cable could not be slacked, because 
the winch had an antiquated manual release mechanism that 
was dangerous to operate in rough weather. By the tme the crew 
of the Maya sighted the barge Apex Chicago, she was aground 
on the Hen and Chicken Shoals, leaking gasoline through a 
gash in her hull. While attempting to pull the barge from the 
rocks, the tug further damaged the barge before going aground. 
The stranded tug and barge were freed when aU .S. Coast Guard 
vessel and two private tugs, the Chicopee and the Jaguar, arrived. 
The Jaguar pulled the Maya free with a floating hawser that 
had been connected by Coast Guard personnel; the Maya pulled 
the Apex Chicago free, and then the Jaguar and the Chicopee 
towed the two vessels to port where the cargo was lightered. In 
the aftermath of the accident, American Home Assurance Co. 
(American) paid several sizable claims to, or on behalf of, Apex 
Oil Company (Apex Oil). These claims included one by the 
Jaguar for "salavage" of the Maya. As a subrogee of Apex Oil, 
American brought an action against L&L to recover the damages 
resulting from the accident, which American alleges were prox­
imately caused by the negligent operation of the Maya by L&L's 
crew. The United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Missouri, awarded judgment to American for one half of the 
sum of provable damages based on the comparative degree of 
fault of the parties. American appealed the decision. 
ISSUES: 1) Is the duty to provide a seaworthy vessel qualified 
by an assumption that the crew will navigate the vessel out of 
harm's way? 
2) Was the allocation of damages according to the 
comparative degree of fault proper? 
3) Was the Jaguar's pulling of the Maya off the 
shoals properly classified as "salvage" or "towage"? 
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals, for the Eight Circuit, affirm­
ing in part and vacating in part, held that the duty of the owner 
to provide a seaworthy vessel is absolute. This absolute duty is 
not qualified by an assumption that the crew will navigate the 
vessel out of harm's way and is defined by the vessel's intended 
voyage, the hazards likely to be encountered and the vessel'·s 
ability to withstand these hazards. The measure of a vessel's 
seaworthiness is not a function of her crew's skill and foresight 
in navigation. The behavior of L&L's crew was negligent, but 
the substantially understrength cable and obsolete stern winch 
(continues .. .) 
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